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This paper discusses the workability of the existing norms of transpar-ency and accountability in the battle against corruption in Nigeria. In-
controvertibly, high level corruption pervades every nook and cranny of the 
country to the detriment of its citizens. Although anti-corruption norms 
exist in the Nigerian legal order, high profile corruption remains endemic, 
suggesting that the norms are unworkable. 
This paper argues that the unworkability of transparency and account-
ability norms in Nigeria is largely attributable to the contradictions, incon-
sistencies or deficiencies inherent therein. Consequently, the paper suggests 
ways of putting the norms to work against corruption in Nigeria.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Corruption has become a fact of life in Nigeria, ravaging the country’s socio-political and economic sectors.1 Though corruption arguably ex-
ists in every country, its effects, extent and magnitude vary from one coun-
try to another. In Nigeria, corruption is arguably so rampant that any break-
ing news on another billion plundered from the national treasury no longer 
outrages an average Nigerian, who has over time learnt to endure it.2 This 
has earned the country the unenviable status of one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world,3 it has also opened the pandora box of those who, 
claiming to rule Nigeria, ruin the country and its economy by looting its 
patrimony.4 It is therefore no coincidence that in a country where the cor-
rupt swim in the ocean of affluence and extravagance,5 over 70 per cent of 
Nigerians live in abject poverty.6 Unfortunately, efforts to tackle corruption 
have yielded no appreciable results. 
1 See, e.g., David Imhonopi and Moses Urim Ugochukwu, ‘Leadership Crisis and Corruption 
in the Nigerian Public Sector: An Albatross of National Development’ (2013) 13: 1 The Af-
rican Symposium 78; N Ikpeze, ‘Fusion of Anti–Corruption Agencies in Nigeria: A Critical 
Appraisal’ (2013) 1: 1 Afe Babalola University Journal of Sustainable Development Law 
and Policy 148, 149; Adeyemi O Oluwatobi, ‘Corruption and Local Government Admin-
istration in Nigeria: A Discourse of Core Issues’ (2012) European Journal of Sustainable 
Development183,190; Joseph C. Ebegbulem, ‘Corruption and Leadership Crisis in Africa: 
Nigeria in Focus’ (June 2012) 3:11 International Journal of Business and Social Science 221 
at 222, 223. 
2 See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku (ed), Corruption and the Crisis of Institutional Reforms in 
Africa (The Edwin Mellen Press 1998) 54-55.
3 E.g., from 1996 to 2005, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the Transparency In-
ternational (TI) consistently perceived Nigeria to be in the category of the six most corrupt 
countries in the world. Breakdown shows that Nigeria featured in the CPI in the following 
descending order: 1st position (1996, 1997 and 2000); 2nd position (1999, 2001 – 2003); 3rd 
position (2004); 5th position (1998); and 6th position (2005). See generally Transparency In-
ternational, Corruption Perception Index <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/over-
view> accessed 28 August 2013. Any indication that the country has improved is betrayed 
by the fact that the country remains very corrupt as evident by the frequency and intensity 
with which public officials despoiled national assets in billions and even trillions of Naira.
4 See, e.g., United States Department of State, ‘Nigeria 2012 Human Rights Report’ (detail-
ing how high profile Nigerian officials – including former Minister of Works and Housing 
Hassan Lawal, former Speaker of the House of Representatives Dimeji Bankole and his 
deputy Usman Nafada, former governors Timipre Sylva {Bayelsa State}, Otunba Gben-
ga Daniel {Ogun State}, Adebayo Alao-Akala {Oyo State], Alhaji Aliyu Doma {Nasarawa 
State}, Muhammed Danjuma Goje {Gombe State} and James Ibori {Delta State}, amongst 
others – fraudulently or allegedly misappropriated billions of dollars belonging to the 
people of Nigeria) 41-44 <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204365.pdf> ac-
cessed 31 March 2014.
5 ibid. 
6 See Microfinance Nigeria, ‘CBN boss: People living below poverty rise to 70%, approves 
three credit bureaus’ (18 January 2011) <http://www.microfinancenigeria.com/latest-news/
cbn-boss-people-living-below-poverty-rise-to-70-approves-three-credit-bureaus/> accessed 
8 February 2014.
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This paper examines the workability of the norms of transparency and 
accountability against high profile corruption in Nigeria. Against this back-
ground, the paper considers the norms of transparency and accountability, 
which are reflected in existing legal machinery against corruption. The pa-
per argues that though the norms are designed to aid corruption control, 
their inherent contradictions, inconsistencies or deficiencies have largely 
crippled the anti-corruption machinery. 
The paper is divided into five sections, this introduction being the first. 
Section two considers the subject matter of corruption and its impacts on 
sustainable development in Nigeria, while section three explores existing 
norms of transparency and accountability. Section four critically examines 
the contradictions, inconsistencies and deficiencies inherent in such norms. 
Finally, section five concludes the discussion with some suggestions.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE NATURE AND EFFECTS  
OF CORRUPTION
Corruption is the misuse or exploitation of public power, position or pat-rimony for personal or familial benefits.7 It may be categorized on the 
basis of several criteria such as the status of offenders, size of the plundered 
assets, etc. Based on this, corruption may be petty or grand. Grand corrup-
tion, which is the focus of this paper, is the plunder of humongous assets by 
high profile public officials. 
According to Rose Ackerman, it is the corruption typology that per-
vades the highest levels of a national government, leading to a broad erosion 
of confidence in good governance, the rule of law and economic stability.8 
For reasons of confidentiality, secrecy or security, many offenders engage in 
corrupt conducts with the assistance of service providers, including family 
members, friends, business partners, financial intermediaries and professional 
consultants.9 Corruption may be bilateral or autogenic. It is bilateral where 
7 See, e.g., Imhonopi and Ugochukwu (n 1) 79; and John Mukum Mbaku, ‘Bureaucratic 
Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups’ (1986) Cato Journal 101-2.
8 Cited in United Nations, ‘The Global Programme Against Corruption: Anti Corruption 
Toolkit,’ 13 n2 <http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/compendium/Compendium/
Tools/UN%20AntiCorruption_toolkit%202003.pdf#search=’Global%20Programme%20
against%20Corruption> accessed 27 August 2013. See also Seumas Miller, et al, Corrup-
tion and Anti-Corruption: An Applied Philosophical Approach (Pearson Prentice Hall 
2005) 20.
9 E.g., The Late dictator Sani Abacha plundered national wealth with the aid of these agents: 
US, ‘Minority Staff Report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Pri-
vate Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities’ 
(hereinafter Minority Staff Report) (1999) 43-50. 
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its consummation requires at least two parties, for example, bribery.10 Auto-
genic corruption relates to corruption typology whose commission is com-
plete without the necessity of binary relations, for example, embezzlement. 
Whatever the typology, corruption is arguably a commonplace across the 
length and breadth of Nigeria. Amidst such aura, public offices have become 
commercial enterprises where corrupt public officials trade off or barter away 
their entrusted positions for illicit wealth. A distinguishing feature of the crime 
is the situs of the proceeds derived therefrom. With the aid of aforementioned 
service providers, offenders locate or relocate their booty from the locus de-
licti commissi or locus criminis through the medium of money laundering to 
foreign jurisdictions such as Europe, Americas, and other financial centres.11 
In sharp contrast with the wealthy and luxurious lifestyles of offenders is the 
penurious and parlous existence of over 70 per cent of Nigerians.12 
In the next subsection, we shall consider the effects of corruption as 
a background to our examining the extant norms of transparency and ac-
countability. 
2.1 Effects of Corruption
With the exception of functionalists – such as Samuel Huntington, Friedrich 
and Merton – who claimed that corruption is beneficial,13 there is a general 
consensus that it is detrimental to the rule of law, good governance and sus-
tainable development.14 Rule of law emphasizes the equality of all before the 
law. But corruption destabilizes such order. It achieves this by serving as a 
medium for concentrating public wealth in a few hands, such wealth consti-
tuting unjust enrichment. Consequently, it complicates inequality between 
the rich and the poor.15 In a country where 70 per cent of citizens are below 
the poverty line, the impact of corruption on rule of law is unimaginable. 
10 Thus, there must be an offeror (giver) on the one hand and offeree (receiver) on the other. 
11 See, e.g., Minority Staff Report (n 9) 11-42 (profiling the laundering activities of Raul 
Salinas of Mexico, Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan, Omar Bongo of Gabon and the children 
of Abacha of Nigeria). Regarding the Abachas’ laundering activities, see also Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission (SFBC), ‘Abacha Funds at Swiss Banks’ (Report of the Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission) (30 August 2000) 13. 
12 See (n 6).
13 See Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions (Gower Publishing 
Company Limited 1990) ch 6.
14 See United Nations (n 8) 14 n.2; and the 7th preamble to the UNCAC which recognizes 
that illicit acquisition of wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, 
national economies and the rule of law.
15 See Nicholas A Goodling, ‘Nigeria’s Crisis of Corruption: Can the UN Global Programme 
Hope to resolve this Dilemma?’ (May 2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
997, 1003.
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It is worse that those who perpetrate corruption are high ranking public 
officials usually perceived by a large spectrum of the people as role models. 
It is in this context of such symbiotic nexus between corruption and public 
office that the conduct is said to catalyze or generate other crimes.16 In other 
words, the involvement of such role models in corrupt conduct weakens 
societal sense of moral and legal responsibility and ultimately constitutes 
a technique of neutralization of guilt or rationalization of wrongs17 in the 
consciousness of those engaging in criminal activities. 
Secondly, good governance is a normative principle of administrative law 
which obliges the State to perform its functions in a manner that promotes 
the values of efficiency, non-corruptibility, and responsiveness to civil soci-
ety.18 Good governance is an anti-corruption tool with five cardinal attributes 
of transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsive-
ness.19 In Nigeria, corruption has overwhelmed such noble attributes, with 
elected or appointed public officials regarding themselves as demi-gods. They 
picture themselves more as masters than servants, recklessly failing to deliver 
the goods and services, or the dividends of democracy to citizens. Since such 
offenders comprise top level public officials who symbolize national sover-
eignty and institutions of governance, citizens tend to associate the plunder of 
national wealth with government, as a result of which governmental institu-
tions are discredited and denied of their trust and loyalty.20 
Lastly, corruption has deleterious effects on sustainable development,21 
which includes social, economic and environmental components. In relation 
to social development, corruption has so hardened the conscience and con-
16 See Oluwaseun Bamidele, ‘Corruption, Conflict and Sustainable Development in African 
States’ (June 2013) 13: 1 The African Symposium 42 at 47-48; see also Obi N I Ebbe, 
‘Heads of State: The Vice Kings and Narcotic Barons’ (1990) 14:2 International Journal 
of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 285 (contending that when a head of state 
commits such crimes as embezzlement and bribery, etc, he creates future regimes of crim-
inals); and S O Osoba, ‘Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives’ (1996) 69 Review 
of African Political Economy 372, 384 (arguing that the magnitude of petty corruption 
reflects the size of grand corruption).
17 Gresham Sykes & David Matza, cited in Obi N I Ebbe, ‘Political Corruption in Africa,’ in 
Rick Sarre, et al (eds), Policing Corruption: International Perspectives (Lexington Books 
2005) 105. 
18 See N Chowdhury and E Skarstedt, ‘The Principle of Good Governance’ (Draft Working 
Paper: A Legal Working Paper in the CISDL ‘Recent Developments in International Law 
Related to Sustainable Development’ Series – Oxford March 2005) 4.
19 ibid 5. See also Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘What is Good Gov-
ernance?’ <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/development/governance/index.htm> ac-
cessed 20 June 2013. 
20 See OECD, Public Sector Corruption: An International Survey of Preventive Measures.
21 See, e.g., Mamman Lawan, ‘Underdevelopment, Corruption and Legal Disorder in Nigeria: 
Exploring a Nexus’ (2012) NIALS Journal of Law and Public Policy 75, 91 – 95.
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sciousness of the average Nigerian that the corrupt massively loot national 
patrimony to the detriment of people-oriented social developmental pro-
grammes22 while the rest of Nigerians – being too upset with the helplessness 
of the Nigerian State amidst such plunder – have been driven to the state of 
anomie under the influence of which they now believe in the inevitability of 
corruption. Economically, corruption distorts the character of government 
expenditure23 and poses negative consequences for foreign investment.24 In 
terms of the environment, corruption undermines attempts by the Nigerian 
State to safeguard the environment for the present and future generations, 
as evident in the neglect of road construction, failure to repair dilapidat-
ed structures, environmental pollution, misallocation of environmental re-
sources, and diversion of public funds from conservation and preservation25 
into private estates and bank accounts, amongst others. Undoubtedly, all 
these corrupt manifestations violate the right to development.26 
The negative implication of corruption for sustainable development is 
compounded by the fact that derived proceeds are laundered out of juris-
diction into private accounts domiciled in foreign banks.27 For example, 
22 cf the 3rd and 7th Preambles to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UN-
CAC) 2003; 6th and 7th Preambles to the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption 2003; and 4th Preamble to the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption 1999.
23 See Philip M Nichols, ‘The Psychic Costs of Violating Corruption Laws’ (2012) Vander-
bilt Journal of Transnational Law 145 at 157 – 159; Mbaku (n 7) 102-103 (“Corruption 
allows inefficient producers to remain in business, encourages governments to pursue per-
verse economic policies, and provides opportunities to bureaucrats and politicians to enrich 
themselves through extorting bribes from those seeking government favours…. the firms 
offering the highest bribes are not necessarily the most economically efficient ones but the 
ones that are efficient in rent seeking”); and Susan Hawley, ‘Exporting Corruption: Pri-
vatization, Multinationals and Bribery,’ (Corner House Briefing 19, 2000) 6 <http://www.
thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/19bribe.pdf> accessed 23 August 
2013 (arguing that bribery inflates the cost of goods and services and increases a country’s 
stock of external debts where the loan is used in paying for the contract costs).
24 See Paolo Mauro, ‘The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Ex-
penditure: A Cross-Country Analysis,’ in Kimberly Ann Elliot (Editor), Corruption and the 
Global Economy (Institute for International Economics 1997) 90-91 (suggesting an inverse 
relationship between corruption and investment). 
25 See USAID, ‘Corruption and the Environment’ (November 2002) pp 4-7 <http://pdf.usaid.
gov/pdf_docs/PNACT876.pdf> accessed 23 May 2014..
26 See, e.g., the two Covenants (ICCPR 1966 and ICESCR 1966); the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Declaration on the Right to Development (41/128, adopted on 4 De-
cember 1986); and the UNGA Millennial Declaration (A/Res/55/2, adopted on 8 September 
2000). See also the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (4 September 
2002) <http://www.un-documents.net/jburgdec.htm> accessed 25 August 2013.
27 See, e.g., ‘Abacha’s Loot Traced to 130 Banks,’ Tell Magazine (Lagos, 24 July 2000) 12-18 
(indicating that funds plundered by Abacha were routed through or hidden in banks located 
in foreign capitals of the world such as London, Geneva, Zurich, New York and Frankfurt). 
Similarly, in March 1990, the French Le Monde had lamented that “every franc we give 
impoverished Africa comes back to France or is smuggled into Switzerland and even Japan:” 
George BN Ayittey, Indigenous African Institutions (Transnational Publishers 1991) 418.
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between mid-1980s and 1999, an amount in excess of $100 billion was 
corruptly exported out of Nigeria alone.28 Having considered the nature 
and the effects of corruption, we now proceed to examine existing norms 
of transparency and accountability preparatory to examining the contradic-
tions, inconsistencies or deficiencies therein.  
3. EXISTING NORMS OF TRANSPARENCY  
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A norm is a model or standard accepted voluntarily or involuntarily by society or other large group, against which society judges someone 
or something.29 In legal theory, it is a binding rule of engagement and, to 
Kelsen, the ‘meaning’ of an act by which a certain behaviour is command-
ed, permitted or authorized.30 In this wise, a norm is a legally binding law, 
or body of rules. ‘Transparency’ and ‘accountability,’ which are some of 
the cardinal principles of good governance,31 mean ‘openness’ and ‘holding 
public officials responsible for their actions’32 respectively.
Therefore, norms of transparency and accountability are tools aimed 
at undermining waste of public resources and disconnecting the network 
of corruption. They are programmed to brighten every dark alley in public 
administration and geared towards rolling away the frontiers of plunder of 
collective patrimony. Basically, the anti-corruption norms manifest in the 
form of preventive and penal measures contained in the Nigerian legal or-
der. In the subsections below, we shall consider existing norms of transpar-
ency and accountability – including the norms of establishing anti-corrup-
tion agencies, code of conduct for public officers, and oversight functions on 
governmental institutions, and the norm of criminalization.
28 See The Financial Times (London, 20 July 1999), quoted in ‘ Multilateral Instruments and 
Strategies Against Corruption: The Role of the United Nations Helping Member States 
Build Integrity to Curb Corruption’ (Ethics in Multilateral and International Organizations 
Workshop: The United Nations, Brisbane: 4 – 7 October 2002) 8; and Festus Iyayi, ‘The 
Primitive Accumulation of Capital in A Neo-Colony: The Nigerian Case’ (1986) 35 Review 
of African Political Economy 27, 37 (observing that the erstwhile Nigeria’s head of State, 
General Buhari, reported in February 1985, for example, that Nigerian politicians had 
salted away an estimated staggering sum of over ￡6 billion in British banks alone).
29 Bryan A Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn, Thomson West 2004) 1086.
30 See L B Curzon, Jurisprudence (Lecture Notes Series) (2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing Ltd 
1995) 120. 
31 See Chowdhury & Skarstedt, (n 18) 4.
32 World Bank, cited in Ndiva Kofele-Kale, ‘Change or Illusion of Change: The War against 
Official Corruption in Africa’ (2006) 38 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev 697, 698 n3. 
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3.1 Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) 
One of the norms of transparency and accountability that international 
legal regime against corruption transmits to domestic legal orders is that 
of prevention against corruption. Thus, pursuant to the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 2003,33 the machinery for pre-
venting corruption includes, amongst other things, anti-corruption agencies 
(ACAs),34 and the code of conduct for public officers35 (to be discussed in 
sub-section 3.2). The creation of a specialized ACA is necessary when cor-
ruption is so pervasive and the law enforcement agencies so corrupt that acts 
of corruption are neither investigated nor prosecuted.36 Within the Nigerian 
Police Force (NPF) is the Special Fraud Unit (SFU), which has been the body 
charged with the duty of handling fraud-related cases. But it failed to live up 
to expectation despite mounting cases of corruption. Consequently, Nigeria 
enacted the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Com-
mission (ICPC) Act 2000,37 which set up the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC),38 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) Act 200239 (now EFCC Act 2004) that established the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The ICPC Act charges the ICPC 
with the responsibility of preventing corruption by, inter alia, examining 
the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies.40 The Act also im-
poses the duty of corruption control on the agency through, amongst other 
things, prosecution of offenders41 and the seizure, freezing or forfeiture of 
their assets.42 Similarly, under the EFCC Act, the EFCC has the duty to, inter 
alia, prevent economic and financial crimes,43 to prosecute offenders and to 
recover their illicit assets.44 
33 Adopted on 31 October 2003 and entered into force on 14 December 2005. Nigeria signed 
and ratified the Convention on 9 December 2003 and 14 December 2004 respectively. 
34 UNCAC, art 6(1).
35 UNCAC, art 8.
36 United Nations Office for Drugs Control and Crime Prevention (UNOCCP), Draft United 
Nations Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy (June 2001) 50.
37 Dated 13 June 2000. See Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Feder-
ation [2002] 9 NWLR 222, 417 (where Uwaifo, JSC, held that the Act is meant to render 
justiciable by legislation the declared State Policy to abolish corrupt practices and abuse of 
power).
38 The 13-member Commission comprises a Chairman and 12 other members.
39 By virtue of the Economic and Financial Commission Act (EFCC) 2002. 
40 See generally, the ICPC Act, s 6. See also James v Okereke [2008] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1105) 544 
CA.
41 See, e.g., ss 6 and 27. 
42 See ss 36-37, 45, 47-48.
43 See the EFCC Act, s 6(f). 
44 See, e.g., ss 26 & 30.
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3.2 Code of Conduct for Public Officers
The norms of transparency and accountability also manifest in the form of 
the Code of Conduct for Public Officials, which is scheduled to the Con-
stitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999.45 There are two 
institutions set up to enforce the provisions of the Code: the Code of Con-
duct Bureau (CCB) and the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), which are 
respectively saddled with the responsibility of administering the Code and 
prosecuting violators.46 The Code mandates public officials to, inter alia, 
avoid conflict of interest,47 declare their assets,48 refrain from operating for-
eign accounts,49 and not to accept gifts, loans or bribes.50 Conflict of interest 
is any situation in which an individual or corporation is in a position to 
exploit a professional or official capacity in some way for their personal or 
corporate benefit.51 Its practical manifestation is seen in the privatization 
of public wealth through high profile corruption. Incontrovertibly, when a 
private individual is appointed to public office, he assumes dual personality: 
being simultaneously a private person and a public official. In the course 
of his duties, the public official is faced with the dilemma of separating 
the private from the public especially where relevant rules are lacking or 
inadequate. Essentially, the Code is meant to aid the public official weather 
the storm of conflict of interest emanating from the interplay of forces of 
personal interests and public interests in the course of performing his duties. 
3.3. Oversight Functions on Governmental Institutions
The seed of transparency and accountability, expressed in the power to 
conduct investigations into the management of public finance, is also sown 
in the enabling instruments which establish public institutions performing 
legislative, executive and judicial functions. For example, S. 88(2)(b) of the 
CFRN 1999 empowers the National Assembly to conduct investigations 
45 See Part II of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(CFRN) 1999. 
46 See s 153(1) of the Constitution, Part I of the Third Schedule, and Parts I and II of the Fifth 





51 Adekunle Ojo, ‘Conflict of Interest in Public Office – Legal provisions and Strategies for 
Enforcement’ (a paper delivered at the National Summit on ‘Conflict of Interest in Public 
Office’ organized by Zero Corruption Coalition held at Hotel Rosbud, Garki, Abuja on 13 
July 2005) 3.
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into any matter over which it has power to make laws for the purpose of, 
inter alia, exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or 
administration of laws within its legislative competence. Pursuant thereto, 
the National Assembly has had occasions to set up panels of inquiry to in-
vestigate cases of corruption or maladministration in ministries, parastatals 
and agencies. Recent attempts culminated in Power Probe,52 Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Probe,53 Pension Scam Probe, 54 and Fuel Sub-
sidy Probe.55 
3.4 Criminalization 
In reflecting the norms of transparency and accountability, every legal sys-
tem prohibits some form of public sector corruption.56 Essentially, it does 
so from the perspective of bribery.57 Thus, the ICPC Act incriminates var-
ious types of bribery such as passive and active bribery,58 trading in influ-
ence,59 gratification through agents,60 bribery in relation to voting for a 
52 The Government of former President Olusegun Obasanjo allegedly spent about US$16 bil-
lion dollars to provide electricity for Nigeria yet the country remains in darkness and the ben-
eficiaries of the loot in luxury. See D Elombah, ‘Olusegun Obasanjo versus Ndudi Elumelu,’ 
<http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=803:oluse-
gun-obasanjo-versus-godwin-elumelu&catid=52:daniel-elombah&Itemid=73> accessed 20 
November 2010.
53 Hearings at the House of Representatives’ Committee on Capital Market revealed large-
scale fraud and mismanagement of public resources. See e.g., ‘Between Oteh And Hembe’ 
at <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/jideofor-adibe/between-oteh-and-hembe.html> ac-
cessed 3 August 2012; and ‘Arunma Oteh at House capital market probe, Okereke-Ony-
iuke blew N186m on Rolex watches’ <http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/
news/45880-arunma-oteh-at-house-capital-market-probe-okereke-onyiuke-blew-n186m-on-
rolex-watches.html> accessed 3 August 2012.
54 According to Senator Aloysious Etok-led Senate Joint Committee on Public Service and 
Establishment and States and Local Government Administration, top government officials 
looted N273.9 billion from pension funds between 2005 and 2011. To the Committee, it 
was ‘syndicated and institutionalised corruption, fraud and embezzlement in the manage-
ment of pension funds in the country.’ See Daily Trust (Lagos, 21 June 2012). 
55 According to the Report of the Ad-hoc Committee on Fuel Subsidy, the difference between 
the N245 billion appropriated for fuel subsidy in 2011 and the N1.3 trillion actually paid 
to marketers largely represented plunder of national wealth. For details, see ‘House of Rep-
resentatives Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee ‘To Verify and Determine the Actual Subsidy 
Requirements and Monitor the Implementation of the Subsidy Regime in Nigeria’ Res-
olution No. (HR.1/2012)’ <http://www.nigerianmuse.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
House-of-Reps-Report-on-Fuel-Subsidy-Probe-April-2012.pdf> accessed 3 August 2012. 
56 See John T Noonan, Jr., Bribes (Macmillan Publishing Company 1984) 702.
57 See, e.g., Biobaku v Police [1951] 20 NLR 30, where Bairamian J. defined corruption in terms 
of bribery when, subsequent to his characterizing ‘corruptly’ to mean ‘improperly,’ he stated 
that impropriety referred to the “receiving or offering of some benefit as a reward or induce-
ment to sway or deflect the receiver from the honest and impartial discharge of his duties.” 
58 ss 8 and 9.
59 ss 10. It does so by prohibiting bribery by any person who receives a benefit by reason of 
what a public official has done, omitted to do, or will do.
60 ICPC Act, s 17; Criminal Code, s 494. 
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decision,61 bribery regarding auctions,62 and bribery for giving assistance 
concerning contract award.63 
The norms considered in this section are norms which should ordinarily 
be able to control corruption. Although relevant law enforcement agencies 
have made some attempts to prosecute some offenders,64 such attempts are 
like a drop in an ocean. In fact, corruption is so pervasive in the country 
that one could argue that while prosecution increases in arithmetic progres-
sion, corruption grows in geometric progression. In the face of the inability 
of anti-corruption norms to stem the tide of corruption in the country, it 
is submitted that, more than anything else, corruption remains persistent 
in the land due largely to the package of contradictions, inconsistencies or 
deficiencies inherent in the normative coalition against corruption. This is 
the subject of examination in the next section. 
4. WORKABILITY OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION  
NORMATIVE ORDER
Against the background of some existing norms of transparency and ac-countability considered in the last section, this section argues that the 
extant anti-corruption normative order is unworkable largely because it is 
weighed down by an array of inherent contradictions, inconsistencies or 
deficiencies. It is the case that because the family of norms simultaneous-
ly contains corruption-reducing and corruption-enhancing norms, the an-
ti-corruption regime appears to approbate and reprobate at the same time. 
Such parasitic relationship between the two opposites renders the machin-
ery against corruption equivocative, ambiguous, inefficacious and ultimate-
ly unworkable. We intend to do justice to the argument advanced herein 
by examining anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), code of conduct for public 
officers, oversight functions over governmental institutions, criminalization 




64 See, e.g., Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & Others 
[2002] 9 NWLR 222,247, SC; Federal Republic of Nigeria v Anache [2004] 3 MJSC 1; 
Federal Government of Nigeria v Tafa Balogun & Others (Unreported) Charge No. FHC/
AB/CR/14/2005; and Federal Republic of Nigeria v Nwude & Others (Unreported) Charge 
No. ID/92C/04.
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4.1 Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs)
Truly, Nigeria started well by formally establishing the ACAs, including the 
ICPC and the EFCC. But the country appears to have ignored the certain 
obligations imposed upon states parties to the UNCAC (including Nigeria). 
Article 6(2) of the UNCAC requires each state party to, inter alia, grant 
ACAs the necessary independence (freedom from undue influence) and ma-
terial resources to enable them carry out their functions effectively. The in-
dependence of the ACAs is measured by so many indices including security 
of tenure, the source of their authority in discharging their duties and the 
trigger of their powers. Regarding tenurial security, the appointment and 
removal of ICPC members are effected by the President of Nigeria subject 
to the confirmation of the Senate.65 Such senatorial confirmation serves to 
secure the tenure of ICPC members because the President is thereby inca-
pacitated from capriciously appointing or removing a member without the 
concurrence of the Senate. But similar provision is lacking in respect of the 
EFCC. EFCC members are appointed by the President for a term of four 
years at the expiration of which they may be reappointed for another one 
term66 subject to the confirmation of the Senate. 
However, any member of the Commission is liable to removal from 
office by the President for inability to discharge the functions of his office or 
for misconduct or if the President is satisfied that it is neither in the interest 
of the Commission nor of the public that the member should continue in 
office without any reference to the confirmation or support of such decision 
by the Senate or the National Assembly.67 This method of removal serious-
ly impairs the security of tenure and, ipso facto, the independence of the 
Commission whose members may have to dance to the tune of the President 
in order to avoid unwarranted removal from office. Evidently, President 
Yaradua relied on this provision to ignominiously remove Nuhu Ribadu 
as the Chairman of the EFCC in questionable circumstances. In December 
2007, the EFCC arrested the ex-governor of Delta State James Ibori, who 
plundered the assets of his State. Though the move pleased overwhelming 
number of Nigerians, it was distasteful to the then President Yaradua and 
the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) Michael Aondoakaa because 
Ibori was their very close ally. Two weeks later, Ribadu was unceremonious-
65  See the ICPC Act, s 3(3), (6) & (8).
66  EFCC Act, s 3(1).
67  See EFCC Act, s 3(2). Emphasis added.
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ly removed from the EFCC.68 No matter how disagreeable EFCC’s action 
against Ibori was, the President could not have so whimsically removed him 
the way he did if there were requirement for senatorial approval. Thus, the 
current situation where EFCC members work in constant fear of the prob-
ability of the President removing any of them at will contradicts the spirit 
of independence that is required to be part and parcel of such agency. Such 
presidential power ultimately compromises the capacity of the EFCC and, 
of course, the workability of the norm authorizing the EFCC to prevent and 
control corruption.   
In connection with the trigger of their powers, the enabling statutes 
generally vest authority in the ACAs to investigate and prosecute matters 
concerned with corruption and financial crimes. However, the ICPC Act 
does not grant the ICPC the autonomy to do so except it is acting on the 
report or petition of a victim of corruption. S. 6(a) of the Act authorizes 
the Commission to receive and investigate reports which shall, by virtue of 
S. 23(2), be rendered by any public officer to whom gratification is given, 
promised or offered, or any person from whom gratification has been so-
licited or obtained. Much as both sections create an avenue for victims of 
corruption (bribery) to ventilate their grievances, and for the ICPC to gather 
intelligence reports, they are deficient because they unduly restrict ICPC’s 
freedom of action by constituting the agency into a reactive, rather than a 
proactive, body. Therefore, it is submitted that pre-conditioning the investi-
gatory powers of the ICPC upon the willingness of the aggrieved victims of 
corruption to complain or petition the anti-corruption agency is ridiculous 
and inconsistent with the contemporary practice of granting proactive, ac-
tive and reactive powers to ACAs.69 
Furthermore, the provision on the material resourcing of the ACAs con-
tradicts the enormous work with which the agencies are saddled. For exam-
ple, the ICPC is starved of funds.70 This state of affairs is deplorable when 
considered against the backdrop of the fact that, in a country like Nigeria that 
is faced with systemic corruption, recording remarkable success in the battle 
68 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic and Fi-
nancial Crimes Commission’ (August 2011) <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
nigeria0811WebPostR.pdf> accessed 28 August 2013.
69 cf EFCC Act, s 7(1).
70 E.g., see ICPC, The Anti-Corruption Digest (a quarterly newsletter of the ICPC: September 
2005) 1.
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against corruption demands huge financial commitment.71 For instance, not-
withstanding the fact that the Commission budgeted N9 billion (about $70 
million) for its capital expenditure for the fiscal year 2002, the government 
approved only a paltry sum of N1 billion (about $7.7 million),72 a step that 
seriously hindered the operations of the Commission. 
4.2 Code of Conduct for Public Officers 
Although the Code of Conduct for Public Officers aims at tackling multi-fac-
eted official misconduct, it is intended here to interrogate the duty of assets 
declaration, prohibition against operating foreign accounts, and silence on 
ownership of property located abroad. The purpose of assets declaration is to 
infuse in every public official the virtue of living within his means. Its raison 
d’être lies in the fact that where the accretion in the public official’s assets 
cannot be explained by his lawful earnings, he is deemed or presumed to have 
illicitly enriched himself by that amount and, therefore, liable to account.
However, public officers are generally cold towards the duty imposed on 
them. And law enforcement agents lack the political will to invoke legal pro-
cess against such defaulters. Thus, upon the assumption of office by a new 
civilian administration in 1979, only the President and the Vice President de-
clared their assets73 yet no disciplinary action was taken against defaulters. In 
2007, upon his assumption of office, President Yaradua publicly declared his 
assets; his deputy, Vice President Jonathan did same reluctantly. Subsequently, 
upon Jonathan’s succession to the throne of presidency in 2011, he displayed 
his aversion for assets declaration.74 
71 In contrast, Hong Kong (which has become an example of a success story in corruption 
control) has 1,300 employees in its payroll and spends $90 million yearly on anti-cor-
ruption activities. See Femi Odekunle, ‘Implementation of the Provisions of the Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act (2000): Criminological Perspectives’ (a paper 
presented at the National Conference on the Problems of Corruption in Nigeria organized 
by the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the National Centre for Women 
Development in Abuja on 26-29 March 2001) 17.
72 See ‘Why anti-corruption war is weak’ Punch (Lagos: 29 February 2012); and M.M.A. 
Akanbi, ‘Why Anti-graft War is slow, by Akanbi’ (an interview the erstwhile Chairman of 
the ICPC chairman granted to Vanguard Newspapers (Lagos, 31 May 2002).
73 John Erero and Toyin Oladoyin, ‘Tackling the Corruption Epidemic in Nigeria’ in Kempe 
Ronald Hope, Sr, and Bornwell C Chikulo (ed), Corruption and Development in Africa: 
Lessons from Country Case-Studies (Palgrave 2000) 284.
74 ‘Jonathan under attack over assets declaration The Nation (Lagos, 26 June 2012) (quoting 
the President to have said that: …I don’t give a damn about that [assets declaration]. The 
law is clear about it and so, making it public is no issue and I will not play into the hands 
of the people. I have nothing to hide. I declared (assets publicly) under the late President 
Umaru Musa Yar’Adua because he did it, but it is not proper. I could be investigated when 
I leave office. You don’t need to publicly declare it and it is a matter of principle. It is not 
the President declaring assets that will change the country.
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Even in cases of apparent compliance, public officers consider it a mere 
formality as they casually make false declaration or under-declare their as-
sets. Violation of the Code is a criminal offence and, where a public official 
fails to declare his assets or makes false declaration, he is liable upon con-
viction under s. 18 of the Code to an order of vacation from office or seat in 
a legislative house, disqualification from membership of a legislative house 
and from holding any public office for a period not exceeding ten years, and 
seizure and forfeiture to the State of any property acquired in abuse or cor-
ruption of office.75 In relation to enforcement, the Code of Conduct Bureau 
(CCB) lacks the competence or integrity to verify such claims unless they 
relate to persons who have fallen short of governmental grace or glory. Such 
lukewarm attitude from both public officials and law enforcement agents 
are contrary to the noble cause of eliminating corruption from the country. 
It is true that the country prohibits certain categories of public officials 
from maintaining or operating foreign account76 in order to cure the mis-
chief of laundering assets plundered from the forum in foreign jurisdictions. 
But experience has shown that this provision is violated more than honoured 
as the cases of Sani Abacha,77 Diepreye Alamieyeseigha,78 Joshua Dariye79 
and James Ibori80 demonstrate.81 However, such prohibition is outdated and 
inconsistent with the spirit of globalization which favours free movement 
75 See s 18(2)(a) – (c).
76 See s 3 of the Code which provides: “The President, Vice-President, Governor, Deputy 
Governor, Ministers of the Government of the Federation and Commissioners of the Gov-
ernments of the States, members of the National Assembly and of the Houses of Assembly 
of the States, and such other public officers or persons as the National Assembly may by 
law prescribe shall not maintain or operate a bank account in any country outside Nigeria.” 
77 The Abachas allegedly maintained numerous foreign accounts in the UK and Switzerland, 
amongst other countries. See, e.g., the Financial Services Authority, ‘FSA Publishes Results 
of Money Laundering Investigation’ (FSA/PN/029/2001: 8 March 2001); and Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission, ‘Abacha Funds at Swiss Banks’ (Report of the Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission) (30 August 2000) 4. 
78 Alamieyeseigha – former governor of Bayelsa State – who was arrested in London on Sep-
tember 2005, was found to have foreign bank accounts in excess of ￡5 million. See Chika 
Amanze-Nwachuku, ‘Alamieyeseigha docked, faces 40-count charge,’ The Guardian (Lagos, 
20 December 2005).
79 Ex-governor Dariye of Plateau State – who was arrested in London by the British Police on 
2 September 2004 for money laundering – was discovered to have eight foreign accounts 
worth more than ￡1 million. See Yusuph Olaniyonu, ‘Dariye: London Police in Nigeria, 
Consult EFCC - To quiz gov next Tuesday in Britain,’ Thisday (Lagos, 10 December 2004).
80 Ibori has been prosecuted and jailed for laundering the proceeds of corruption committed 
in Nigeria within the jurisdiction of the UK. See ‘U.S. Seizes Over $3 Million in Looted 
James Ibori Assets’ <http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/news/breaking-news/183549-u-s-seiz-
es-over-3-million-in-looted-james-ibori-assets.html> accessed 24 July 2012. 
81 The findings of the EFCC, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and other security agencies 
in early 2004 indicated that a minimum of 25 governors, and many ministers and members 
of the National Assembly were discovered to be maintaining foreign accounts. See ‘Corrupt 
Governors: Why More May Go to Jail,’ Tell Magazine (Lagos, 17 October 2005) 27. 
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of persons, goods, services and finance across jurisdictions. Ordinarily, this 
is beneficial to the economies of such jurisdictions and the private fortunes 
of investors involved. But within the context of high profile corruption in 
Nigeria, a law prohibiting officials from maintaining or operating bank ac-
count abroad is understandable because such accounts would probably be 
filled with assets looted from the public treasury. Yet Nigeria appears to 
have taken it too far in stripping its officials of the benefit of running bank 
account abroad simply because stolen wealth may find their way to those 
accounts. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Code criminalizes foreign 
ownership of bank account without simultaneously proscribing ownership 
of property abroad. But cases have shown that corrupt Nigerians launder 
their ill-gotten wealth either through ownership of foreign bank accounts 
or acquisition of foreign-based assets such as real estate, hotels, shares and 
stocks. The Code can ill-afford such contradiction between prohibiting for-
eign bank account maintenance or operation and silence on the legitimacy 
or otherwise of owning assets abroad. 
4.3 Oversight Functions on Governmental Institutions
The tool of oversight functions performs the important role of infusing 
transparency and accountability into the running of governmental institu-
tions and in the process eliminates waste and mismanagement so that assets 
appropriated for projects and programmes would be available for disburse-
ment. But experience has shown that the report produced by such investiga-
tive tool easily runs into somewhat contrived troubled waters because of the 
resilience of the institution of corruption and its promoters to viciously fight 
back and frustrate every effort aimed at tackling corruption. For instance, 
the Power Probe Panel, led by Ndidi Elumelu, found that the $16 billion that 
President Obasanjo’s government invested in the power sector went with the 
wind. On the eve of the submission of the Panel’s Report containing such 
incriminating information, the law enforcement agents accused and indicted 
the Chairman of the Panel and others of N5.2 billion fraud in connection 
with contracts awarded for Rural Electrification Project.82 That signaled the 
death of the Report! Yet the court case was subsequently struck out by an 
Abuja High Court in June 2013 because the prosecution failed to establish a 
82 The particulars of the indictment included breach of due process, criminal conspiracy, di-
version and misappropriation of public funds See Freedom Online, ‘N5.2bn REA scam: 
Court grants Elumelu, others’ no-case submission’ <http://freedomonline.com.ng/n5-2bn-
rea-scam-court-grants-elumelu-others-no-case-submission> accessed 20 January 2014. 
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prima facie case.83 Similarly, there was the Fuel Subsidy Probe Panel headed 
by Farouk Lawan. A few weeks after the Panel submitted a report which 
implicated many corporations and individuals for ripping the nation off by 
trillions of naira, the Chairman of Zenon Oil, Mr. Otedola, accused Lawan 
of accepting $620,000 bribe from him. Consequently, attention now shifted 
from the Report to Otedola’s allegations. Presently, the Report is in limbo 
while Lawan and his accomplice have been arraigned in court.84 
Interestingly, the fate that befalls these probes has precedent in history. 
The executive arm of government has had ample opportunities to institute 
panels of inquiry85 into the mismanagement and plunder of national assets 
in national institutions86 including the Nigerian National Petroleum Cor-
poration (NNPC) Probe Panel (1993); the Nigeria Police Force Probe Pan-
el (1994); Nigerian Customs Service Probe Panel (1994); Judiciary Probe 
Panel (1994); Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission (1995); 
and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Probe Panel (1994). Unfortunately, 
however, although these Panels submitted their reports, the government nei-
ther published nor implemented them.87 What then is the wisdom in spend-
ing huge human and material resources in setting up panels of inquiry only 
to dump their reports in the thrash can? Thus, with the country having a 
record of unimplemented probe panel reports, the legitimacy of the institu-
tion of probe panels is discredited.88
4.4 Criminalization 
Nigerian law relies heavily on bribery as the focal point of its prohibition 
of corruption. Surely, bribery is the paradigm of corruption.89 However, de-
spite the utility of its copious reach against bribery, the ICPC Act is deficient 
because it presumes that only bribery makes up the family of corruption. It 
83 ibid.
84 ‘$620,000 Bribery Scam: Lawan, Emenalo Arraigned Remanded In Kuje Prisons,’ The 
Guardian (Lagos, 1 February 2013).
85 The regime of Abacha generously used this mechanism in the investigation of corruption 
and official misconduct in government parastatals.
86 See Gani Fawehinmi, ‘Probing Corruption in Nigeria’ <http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/
publication/fawehinmi/012604.html> accessed 17 January 2014. 
87 ‘400 Probe Panels in 12 years, no action on Reports’ <http://igede.org/2011/06/11/400-
probe-panels-in-12-years-no-action-on-reports> accessed 20 January 2014. 
88 The major demerit of the probe system is that the findings of a probe panel are subject to 
the decision of acceptance or rejection of the government. In the majority of cases, the gov-
ernment fails to take any such decision, or issues a White Paper in rejection of the findings. 
See Osoba (n 16) 385; Nwankwo, (n 1)194 – 195; and Fawehinmi (n.86).
89 See, e.g., Peter J Henning, ‘Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International 
Corruption Conventions and United States Law’ (2001) 18 Arizona Journal of Internation-
al and Comparative Law 825.
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is a faulty assumption. When considered from the perspective of the parties 
to the crime, corruption can be categorized into two: bilateral corruption 
and autogenic corruption. Bilateral corruption is a product of bargain or ne-
gotiation, for example, bribery. On the other hand, autogenic corruption is 
the conduct that dispenses with bilateral transactional settings, for instance, 
embezzlement. But, while the ICPC Act provides adequately for bribery, it 
fails to do so in respect of embezzlement. Such approach tends to blur the 
reality of the dichotomy between the two. 
It is conceded that S. 315 of the Penal Code90 adequately provides 
against embezzlement.91 But the snag is that the Penal Code applies only 
to the Northern part of the country, implying that the law enforcement 
agencies cannot utilize the section to prosecute embezzlement committed in 
Southern Nigeria. Although the Code predates the ICPC Act, the National 
Assembly failed woefully to replicate s. 315 thereof in the ICPC Act92 result-
ing in a situation where the crime of embezzlement cannot be evenly and 
adequately tackled throughout the country. Unfortunately, because of the 
vacuum created by the absence of an apt provision against embezzlement, 
prosecutors seeking to indict offenders in the southern part of the country 
are left to improvise s. 1993 to prosecute offenders. The section criminalizes 
abuse of functions, a key ingredient in the definition or characterization of 
corruption. It is an omnibus, residual or general section that can be activat-
ed in the absence of a specific provision against a particular corrupt con-
duct. Therefore, a situation where prosecutors rely on a general provision to 
deal with the specific crime of embezzlement is unsatisfactory. 
Such lop-sided anti-corruption measure, which creates escape route 
from responsibility for many offenders who plunder the treasury through 
means other than by bribery, has the potential to fuel corruption for the 
following reasons. First, though bilateral corruption is committed the most, 
illicit assets derived therefrom are smaller than those generated from auto-
90 Cap 89, LFN, 1990. The Code is applicable exclusively to the Northern part of Nigeria.
91 It provides: “Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion 
over property in his capacity as a public servant … commits a criminal breach of trust in 
respect of that property shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to fourteen 
years and shall also be liable to fine.”
92 cf UNCAC, art 17.
93 It provides: any public officer who uses his office to gratify or confer any corrupt or unfair 
advantage upon himself or any relation or associate of the public officer or any other public 
officer shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for 
five (5) years without option of fine. 
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genic corruption.94 Therefore, from the viewpoint of criminal justice policy, 
the crime which produces larger assets ought to attract greater legislative 
attention. But in failing to reflect this in legislation, the National Assem-
bly appears to have sent out an erroneous message of handsome payoff 
awaiting those who dare to commit autogenic corruption. Secondly, upon 
the presumption that autogenic corruption (from which larger illicit assets 
derive) causes greater harm to the society, such corruption ought to be pun-
ished more severely than bilateral corruption. However, because the Nation-
al Assembly fails to recognize such harm differential (as a result of which it 
adopts an unrealistic and disproportionate penal measure), autogenic cor-
ruption is punished even more leniently than bilateral corruption.95 
From the foregoing, our criminal justice system tends not to have been 
guided by principal penological theories of retribution and deterrence96 which 
are primarily geared towards making offenders or convicts atone for their con-
duct proportionate to the harm inflicted upon the society. This submission is 
painfully confirmed by unduly lenient sentences the courts have been handing 
down to accused persons in some recent cases including those involving former 
Inspector General of Police (IGP) Tafa Balogun,97 who was sentenced to six 
months, former Governor of Bayelsa State Alamieyeseigha98 (2 years), former 
Nigeria Ports Authority Chairman and ruling PDP stalwart Olabode George 
(2 and half years),99 and Cecilia Ibru (6 months).100 Such low tariff or huge 
discount in sentencing, which constitutes an incentive to offenders, deserves a 
drastic review. 
94 See S A Igbinedion, ‘Grand Corruption, Recovery and Repatriation of Derived Proceeds: 
International Criminal and Comparative Law Perspectives: The Case of Nigeria’ (2008) 15 
Gakushuin University Law Review 15.
95 Thus, whereas the maximum penalty for bribery is 7 years, the maximum for autogenic 
corruption is 5 years! See the ICPC Act, s 8 cf s 19. 
96 Charles F Abel and Frank H Marsh, Punishment and Restitution: A Restitutionary Ap-
proach to Crime and the Criminal (Greenwood Press 1984); and Jules L Coleman (ed), 
Philosophy of Law: Crimes and Punishment (Vol. 4, Garland Publishing Inc. 1994).
97 See Federal Government of Nigeria v Tafa Balogun & Others (Unreported) Charge No. 
FHC/AB/CR/14/2005. The former Inspector General of Police (IGP) was indicted under s 
14 of the defunct Money Laundering Act 2003 and s 14 of the extant Money Laundering 
Act 2004 on a 56-count charge of laundering the proceeds he derived from his theft and 
embezzlement of about N17 billion (about US$132million). Upon his guilty plea, he was 
sentenced to a ridiculous 6-month imprisonment. See S A Igbinedion, ‘A Critical Appraisal 
of the Mechanism for Prosecuting Grand Corruption Offenders under the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption 2003’ (2009) 6:1 Manchester Journal of International 
Economic law 56, 62. 
98 He was convicted on a six-count charge of fraud involving billions of naira. ibid. 
99 (Unreported) Charge No. ID/71C/2008. In over N85 billion fraud for which he was pros-
ecuted with 5 other accused persons, he was convicted for contract splitting, inflation, 
abuse of office and disobedience to lawful order. See ‘Nigerian Ports Authority Contract 
Bazaar: Bode George Jailed 28 Years’ <http://www.modernghana.com/news2/246153/1/ni-
gerian-ports-authority-contract-bazaar-bode-geor.html> accessed 7 January 2014. 
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4.5 Exclusion of Civil Society from Corruption Control
The reality of globalization impels states to, amongst other things, cede 
some form of power to individuals and civil society especially in the face 
of the failure of many states to efficiently perform their traditional roles. 
Therefore, Article 13(1) of the UNCAC mandates states parties to actively 
involve civil society in the prevention and control of corruption. Realizing 
that state or government is not an embodiment of superior wisdom, the pro-
vision seeks to demonopolize state overbearing presence in the management 
of matters having to do with the patrimony and welfare of their citizens. 
Such liberalization of functions is meant to pave way for civil society’s active 
participate in efforts against corruption. 
It appears Nigerian legislation allows civil society involvement in pro-
cesses leading to corruption control. The ICPC Act permits any person (in-
cluding civil society) and public officials to report corruption matters to the 
ICPC which shall thereafter investigate the contents therein for the purpose 
of, inter alia, prosecuting offenders.101 Hopefully, the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) 2011102 will enhance the capacity of informants in this re-
gard. A person or official wishing to petition the ICPC can do so in either of 
two ways: online submission or hard copy submission.103 Although online 
submission of complaint poses no major problem, hard copy submission 
does. This is because a complainant or informant who chooses to submit a 
complaint or report by hand is required to furnish the Commission with 16 
copies thereof together with the same number of copies of all relevant docu-
ments and annexure. Such procedure for paper submission – which includes 
the duty of the informant to produce, at his own expense, 16 copies of each 
complaint (and its supporting documents) – constitutes a disincentive for 
those who might be willing to report corruption case in the prescribed man-
ner. Again, it is considered too formalistic and bureaucratic to condition 
the reportage of information on written documentary evidence since other 
media of whistle-blowing corrupt conducts such as phone call, fax, and 
e-mail can effectively serve as good notification to ICPC officials and other 
law enforcement agents. Notably, most jurisdictions have simplified the way 
100 The former Managing Director of defunct Oceanic Bank plc was prosecuted for criminal 
manipulation of bank records and depositors’ funds running into hundreds of millions 
of dollars. See ThisDay (Lagos, 8 October 2010). See also Federal Republic of Nigeria v 
Cecilia Ibru (Unreported) Charge No. FHC/L/297C/2009, per Justice Abutu. 
101 See, e.g. ICPC Act, s 6(a) and 23(2). 
102 Enacted on 24 May 2011 and entered into force on 28 May 2011.
103 See ‘Petition Guidelines’ <http://icpc.gov.ng/petition/> accessed 20 August 2013.
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and manner citizens report cases of corruption to relevant authorities. In the 
US, for example, all that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) requires 
members of the public to do in order to whistle blow corruption is to call 
any of its corruption hotlines. Instructively, it is salutary to note that S. 64 
of the ICPC Act provides for the protection of informants and sanctity of 
information.104 
However, it is noteworthy that the foregoing discussion relates only 
to civil society administrative participation in corruption control, meaning 
that it can operate only as an appendage of public officials or governmen-
tal institutions. Consequently, civil society is incapacitated in the face of 
official reluctance to activate anti-corruption machinery against offenders. 
Therefore, the law empowering civil society participation is deficient be-
cause it fails to grant some level of independence to civil society willing to 
act against corruption where there is such official or governmental reticence. 
In discussing this section, one recurrent decimal was manifest: the legal 
regime against corruption is riddled with contradictions, inconsistencies or 
deficiencies. Because they operate at cross-purposes, they are more of liabil-
ity than assets in the battle against corruption. It is submitted that this cir-
cumstance explains the reason why the anti-corruption battle appears to be 
unworkable, generating heat without fire, and motion without movement. 
Consequently, the next section proffers some suggestions for reform.
5. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Since we have diagnosed the normative order against corruption to be unworkable largely by reason of its inherent contradictions, inconsisten-
cies or outright deficiencies, we will in the sub-sections below proffer some 
useful suggestions that could help put the norms to work. 
5.1 Restructuring ACAs
The two existing ACAs are the Independent Corrupt Practices Commis-
sion (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). 
Although both were set up to generally prosecute the anti-corruption war, 
their separate existence is bound to generate duplication of functions be-
cause the element of breach of trust or misuse of entrusted power character-
izes both ‘corrupt practices’ and ‘economic and financial crimes.’ Therefore, 
104 cf UNCAC, art 33 (protection of reporting persons).
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it is suggested that the ICPC and the EFCC be merged into one body com-
prising specialized departments or units to handle different types of cor-
ruption, and economic and financial crimes. Expectedly, such departments 
or units should, inter alia, include that which is empowered to treat high 
profile public sector corruption (grand corruption) and associated money 
laundering. Adherence to this suggestion could pave way for the emergence 
of an institutionalized ACA whose units will have the capacity to cover 
their allotted field of operations. Definitely, there is need to astronomically 
increase government funding of the ACAs unlike the situation where ex-
tant ACAs are not adequately funded.105 But a more enduring measure of 
opening up credit lifeline for ACAs would be to make it legally possible 
for them to, like the present EFCC, receive funds from non-governmental 
authorities and persons. It should be recalled that in addition to its being 
funded by government, the EFCC is permitted by S. 35(3) of the EFCC Act 
to accept gifts of land, money or other property within and outside Nigeria 
upon such terms and conditions as may be specified by the donor, provided 
the terms and conditions are not contrary to the objectives and functions of 
the Commission. 
5.2 Location of Assets 
It was submitted in section 4 that the legislation prohibiting public officials 
from maintaining or operating a foreign account is outdated and inconsistent 
with the reality of globalization. Basically, depositing illicitly sourced money 
into a bank account or using it to acquire assets is widely recognized as an 
abuse of the financial system and cited for money laundering across several 
jurisdictions. It is such abuse, not the use, of a foreign bank account or other 
financial outlets that Nigeria should tackle. Public officials who are so inter-
ested in maintaining or operating a foreign account should not be inhibited 
from so doing because money lodged into such accounts will yield interests or 
profits. Interestingly, assets targeted for confiscation or forfeiture include such 
interests or profits. Ditto for assets purchased abroad. We believe the mis-
chief against which such legislation (prohibiting foreign account ownership) 
was enacted can be overcome when the country takes a couple of remedial 
steps. Firstly, whoever opens, maintains, operates or owns a bank account 
or acquires assets in a foreign jurisdiction must expressly state that fact in 
105 ‘Nigeria: Tambuwal Calls On FG to Fund Anti-Graft Agencies,’ ThisDay (Lagos, 9 April 
2013).
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the assets declaration form. Secondly, Nigeria should conclude mutual legal 
assistance treaties (MLATs) with as many foreign jurisdictions as possible. 
In the third place, the country should cooperate with regional arrangements 
on corruption, money laundering and assets recovery, for example, by acced-
ing to the OECD Convention 1997.106 Against this background, whoever is 
found to have assets in the country and abroad in excess of his lawful income 
must be made to face the music. In addition to the domestic measures that 
would be meted out to such official, the country should invoke the mutual le-
gal assistance mechanism by contacting relevant jurisdictions for the purpose 
of enabling the requested states to take any provisional (seizure or freezing) 
and permanent (confiscation or forfeiture) measures against relevant assets. 
But it must be noted that one of the starting points of investigation 
should be the assets declaration form to which the public now has access 
by virtue of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2011. However, be-
cause declarants are economical with the truth, the Code of Conduct Bureau 
must be rejuvenated and sufficiently empowered to verify claims contained 
in the assets declaration form. Moreover, civil society should be encouraged 
to constantly and consistently conduct investigations into the information 
contained in the form on the one hand and the information relating to the 
actual acquisitions of public officials on the other. Such information can be 
fed to relevant ACAs for necessary action. 
5.3 Character of Probe
In Nigeria, the institution of probe has become notorious for achieving the 
opposite of what it is meant to do. If we must be able to hold persons 
accountable and responsible, the machinery of probe must be sacrosanct 
by genuinely predicating governmental action on its findings, reports and 
recommendations. Obviously, it is counter-productive for the government 
to issue a White Paper, as is its usual practice, which seeks to weaken the 
substance of such report. Therefore, it is suggested that government should, 
in good faith, immediately publish any report submitted by a probe panel 
and set in motion the process of engaging the criminal or civil responsibility 
of persons indicted. As appropriate, such persons must be prosecuted or 
sued and, amongst other measures, made to restore proceeds from illicit 
origin constituting unjust enrichment in their hands. But in instituting such 
106 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions 1997.
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a probe panel, care must be taken not to include persons whose character or 
pedigree may likely undermine the integrity of the panel’s report.107 There 
must be a procedure whereby a prospective member of such panel is made 
to declare any material fact that may disqualify his membership and even to 
undertake to indemnify the country in the event of loss or dent to the report 
by reason of his failure to disclose such disqualifying fact, or his subsequent 
complicit conduct (e.g., accepting bribe in respect of the panel’s work). In 
other words, persons of questionable character must not find their way into 
a probe panel. The invitation to participate in a probe is a moral calling and 
members of the panel must, like Caeser’s wife, be above board. Where a 
member or some members of a panel are found to have compromised them-
selves, their report should not be totally discarded. We should avoid this 
habit of throwing the baby out with the bath water. Where possible, only 
the tainted part of the document should be severed and so discarded. But in 
the (un)likely event of all the members being found to have compromised 
themselves necessitating the abandonment of the report, another panel must 
be set up with dispatch. 
5.4 Penal Reform
It was observed in Section 4 that there is disharmony between the crime of 
corruption and the punishment thereof. In order to restore the equilibrium, 
there is the need to introduce proportionate penalization in our legislation 
so that penalty for corruption will reflect the harm to citizens and the coun-
try. In this way, high profile corruption offenders should receive the highest 
form of penalty, for example, 30 years imprisonment upon conviction. For 
the purpose of uniform application of the suggested maximum jail term of 
30 years throughout the country, it is important to expressly repeal S. 315 
of the Penal Code. Additionally, because corruption is committed with eco-
nomic consideration, a convicted person must be made to disgorge whatever 
gain he ever got from his criminal conduct. This can be achieved by impos-
ing heavy fine on him and confiscating or forfeiting assets he acquired from 
the criminal enterprise. Notably, Article 20 of the ICPC Act 2000 obligates 
a person convicted of giving bribe to a public official to pay a fine of not less 
than five times the sum of the value of the gratification. Unfortunately, the 
section is seldom applied. A golden opportunity for such application was 
frustrated by the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) Adoke Mo-
107 E.g., this will counter the mischief of the scandal involving the Chairman of the Fuel 
Subsidy Probe Panel, Farouk Lawan. 
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hammed who, in a bid to protect certain multinational companies (MNCs) 
such as Halliburton, Siemens and Julius Berger from prosecution, imposed 
ridiculously low administrative fines on them.108 Instructively, such ministe-
rial imposition lacked legal foundation. Therefore, the imposition of admin-
istrative fines should be generally discouraged. Where it becomes inevitable, 
then the administrator of such fines must be obligated to impose fines that 
are realistically based on existing law, not on his whim. Regarding confis-
cation or forfeiture, both home-based and foreign-based assets of offenders 
must be vigorously pursued through bilateral procedures. Moreover, judges 
must be sensitized to the calamitous consequences of corruption so that 
they would appreciate the necessity of privileging the corrective justice of 
depriving offenders of the fruits of their criminal ventures over diversionary 
technicalities relied upon by offenders who are out to make life worthless 
for most Nigerians.109 
5.5 Engaging Civil Society in Corruption Control
Beyond the administrative services that civil society may render in the battle 
against corruption, there is the need to adequately empower it to, in civil 
or criminal cases, independently proceed against persons who plunder the 
common wealth in circumstances where public officials or institutions au-
thorized to do so fail to so do. Under the current legal order, the capacity 
of civil society to so act is seriously undermined by the common law doc-
trine of locus standi. A person is said to have locus standi if he has shown 
sufficient interest in the matter by demonstrating that his civil rights and 
obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed.110 Locus standi 
is the qualification or eligibility of a litigant to sue or to be heard in court. 
Such litigant must demonstrate special interest over and above everyone else 
in the subject matter of complaint or dispute. Locus standi can arise in both 
criminal and civil cases. 
In criminal cases, S. 174(1)(a) of the CFRN invests the Attorney Gen-
eral of the Federation (AGF) with the sole superior authority to institute 
108 See S A Igbinedion, ‘Culpability of AGF in multinational companies’ corporate liability,’ 
The Guardian (Lagos, 23 August 2011).
109 See, e.g., FRN v Ibori (Unreported) Charge No: FHC/ASB/IC/09 which was unfortu-
nately resolved in favour of the accused person and others by reliance on the ejusdem 
generis rule. However, it is the same Ibori that was subsequently prosecuted for fraud 
and money laundering and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment in the UK. 
110 See, e.g., the A-G of Adamawa State v A-G of the Federation [2005] 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 
581 at 263. See also Olagunju v Yahaya [1998] 3 NWLR (Pt. 542) 501; Ogbuehi v Gov. of 
Imo State [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 417) 53; and Okafor v Asoh [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) 35.
174          AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY: JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW AND POLICY (2014) 3:1
and undertake criminal proceedings against any person in Nigeria.111 No-
tably, S. 174(3) requires the AGF to do so having regard to public interest, 
the interest of justice and the need to prevent abuse of legal process. What 
happens where the AGF fails, refuses or neglects to prosecute offenders in 
blatant violation of the obligation imposed upon him by S. 174(3)? Specifi-
cally, for example, what measures ought to be taken against the incumbent 
AGF Mohammed Adoke who handled the $180 million worth corruption 
case involving Halliburton112 in an ‘administrative’ manner that subverted 
and sabotaged such obligation? Instead of prosecuting the complicit natural 
and juristic persons under extant law and exacting restitution in favour of 
the state, the AGF gave them administrative reprieve upon their payment of 
a pittance in full and final settlement of the case.113 Similarly, his immediate 
predecessor under President Yaradua, Mike Aondoakaa, misconducted him-
self by openly frustrating the efforts of the EFCC to prosecute James Ibori 
who plundered millions of dollars from the treasury of Delta State.114 It is 
noteworthy that when Ibori finally escaped the country, he was convicted for 
fraud and money laundering-related offences in the UK.115 Unfortunately, 
even where the performance of the AGF violates the proviso to S. 174, the 
law expects citizens to do nothing but to endure pending when it pleases the 
appointor of the AGF to relieve him of his duty. This state of the law is highly 
unsatisfactory. Though there is no serious objection to AGF’s being the alpha 
and the omega in prosecution, such monopoly should be broken in deserving 
cases, for instance, where, amidst his refusal to prosecute obvious cases of 
corruption, there are persons willing to undertake such prosecution. 
Under the existing law, no private person can undertake criminal prose-
cution unless he has been directly or indirectly instructed to do so by the AGF 
or, at any rate, he must have sought and obtained the fiat of the AGF.116 Al-
though the Supreme Court initially toed a liberal line in Fawehinmi v. Akilu117 
111 See Commissioner of Police v Joseph Tobin [2009] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1148] 62 CA. For 
equivalent provision relating to the Attorney General of a State of the Federation, see 
CFRN 1999, s 211(1)(a).
112 ‘Halliburton paid $180 million in bribes to senior Nigerian government officials’ (4 Sep-
tember 2008) <http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2008/09/04/halliburton-paid-180-mil-
lion-in-bribes-to-senior-nigerian-government-officials/> accessed 15 March 2014.
113 See Igbinedion, Culpability of AGF (n 108). 
114 ‘Revealed: Another Aondoakaa/EFCC memo to discard Ibori’s case’ (20 August 2009) 
<http://saharareporters.com/report/revealed-another-aondoakaaefcc-memo-discard-ibo-
ris-case?page=1> accessed 5 February 2014.
115 ‘Former Nigeria governor James Ibori jailed for 13 years’ (17 April 2012) <http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-17739388> accessed 3 February 2014.
116 See Commissioner of Police v Joseph Tobin (n 109) 88-9. 
117 [1987] 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 797.
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by ruling in favour of the locus standi of a private person to initiate prosecu-
tion, it soon retraced its step into its conservative shell when it circumscribed 
that right to the limits set by S. 342 of the Lagos State Criminal Procedure 
Law, which provides for perjury. Therefore, it is submitted that private per-
sons ought to be empowered to embark on private prosecution or to have the 
locus to cause a writ of mandamus to issue against (an inefficient) AGF or 
any other authority to perform their duties. The presumption that the AGF 
would act in the public interest is too much of an assumption that must be 
overridden by a provision empowering private prosecution. 
On the other hand, in civil cases (e.g., tort), the subject of nuisance usu-
ally generates controversies as to the locus standi of parties to sue. There 
are two types of nuisance: private nuisance and public nuisance. Whereas 
private nuisance is a condition that interferes with a person’s enjoyment of 
property, public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right com-
mon to the general public, such as a condition dangerous to health, offensive 
to community moral standards, or unlawfully obstructing the public in the 
free use of public property.118 Apart from being a crime, corruption can be 
considered a civil wrong which may give rise to a claim predicated on private 
nuisance or public nuisance. In private nuisance, a contractor who lost out 
in a bid to secure a contract because of his competitor’s bribing of some gov-
ernment officials can sue because he would be able to establish special or pe-
culiar loss therein. Corruption can be treated as a public nuisance because it 
unlawfully interferes with the right of citizens to freely enjoy and dispose of 
their collective patrimony. Any damage or mischief arising therefrom is ac-
tionable at the instance of the AGF or, with his fiat, by a private individual.119 
But outside the fiat of the AGF, a private person or litigant can have a right 
of action for public nuisance only if he can establish that he has sustained 
particular damage over and above the general inconvenience and injury suf-
fered by the public.120 Thus, in Senator Abraham Adesanya v. President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria.,121 the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that 
the plaintiff/appellant lacked locus standi because the matter did not relate 
to his civil rights and obligations as a person. Consequently, only the AGF 
can claim against the tortfeasor, just as it is in criminal cases. Therefore, 
arguments or critique we advanced in respect of the prosecutorial powers of 
118 Garner (n 29) 1097,1098.
119 See Reynolds Construction Co. (Nigeria) Ltd v Mr. Edward Okwejiminor [2001] 15 
NWLR (Pt 735) 787 CA.
120 SPDC Ltd v Adamkue [2003] 11 NWLR (Pt. 832) 533,597 CA.
121 (1981) 5 SC (Reprint) 69, 88. 
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the AGF equally applies, mutatis mutandis, to his absolute authority to sue 
in civil cases. Since corruption is a public matter, logic may have informed 
the vesting of the authority to sue in the AGF but in view of the exercise or 
non-exercise of such power contrary to public interest, fairness demands the 
liberalization of the rule on locus standi so that the AGF would cease to be 
the only centre of gravity on the issue of ventilating public grievance over 
massive plunder of national treasury. 
6. CONCLUSION
This paper attempted a diagnosis of the persistence of high profile cor-ruption despite the array of anti-corruption norms in Nigeria. Although 
the country’s legal order formally prohibits corruption, it however accom-
modates contradictions, inconsistencies or deficiencies. Consequently, be-
cause it is unhealthy for a legal order to simultaneously blow hot and cold, 
the anti-corruption norms appear to be equivocal, ambiguous, inefficacious 
and unworkable. Therefore, in order to put the norms against corruption to 
work, we have suggested some reforms relating to the restructuring of an-
ti-corruption agencies, location of illicit assets, character of probes, penal-
ization and civil society participation in corruption control. It is our sincere 
hope that concerted legislative and administrative action be undertaken by 
relevant authorities and agencies so that every negative norm is eliminated 
from the normative legal order against corruption. It is believed that such 
measure would strengthen the norms of transparency and accountability 
and ipso facto drastically reduce if not eliminate high profile corruption 
from the land.
